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ABSTRACT
Tasked in 2011 with creating powerful new patent review trial regimes, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office—through the efforts of their freshly empowered quasi-judicial body, the Patent Trial
and Appeal Board—set to creating a fast-paced trial with limited discovery and concentrated
efficiency. For two years, the proceedings have proved potent, holding unpatentable many of the
claims that reached decisions on the merits. Yet a small subsection of petitions never make it past the
starting gate, resulting in wasted time and effort on the parts of petitioners—and likely sighs of relief
from the rights-holders. The AIA exempted institution decisions from appellate review, and the
Federal Circuit recently held such decisions—denials and institutions alike—are outside that court’s
appellate jurisdiction. Parties bringing and defending petitions can learn volumes by looking to the
set of denials of institution prior to In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies. In a regime where so many
petitions have been granted, knowing the ones that haven’t could be the key to success.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“The game is rigged, but you cannot lose if you do not play.” 4
The numbers look grim. The America Invents Act of 2011 introduced new
administrative trials meant to quickly, effectively, and extrajudicially challenge
existing patent rights. 5 Three—Inter partes review (IPR), post-grant review (PGR),
and transitional covered business method patent post-grant review (CBM)—repres ent
a seismic shift in U.S. patent practice. 6 Congress intended they would cancel patents
the PTO should never have granted. 7 To date, they have been thoroughly effectual—
1 * These materials reflect only the personal views of the authors and are not individualized legal
advice and do not reflect the views of Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP
(including Finnegan Europe LLP, and Fei Han Foreign Legal Affairs Law Firm) (“Finnegan”) or
American University Washington College of Law. It is understood that each case is fact-specific and
that the appropriate solution in any case will vary. Therefore, this article may or may not be relevant
to any particular situation. Thus, neither Finnegan nor Washington College of Law cannot be bound
either philosophically or as representatives of their various present and future clients to the comments
expressed in these materials. This article does not establish any form of attorney-client relationship
with Finnegan or the authors. While every attempt was made to insure that these materials are
accurate, errors or omissions may be contained therein, for which liability is disclaimed.
2* © Jarrad Wood & Jonathan R. K. Stroud 2014. Jarrad Wood is a third-year law student at
American University Washington College of Law, focusing on Intellectual Property. Mr. Wood studie d
biology and neuroscience at Williams College. He would like to acknowledge, among others, Professor
James Toupin for his contributions to this paper, and Rebecca Pomerantz for her support and
encouragement.
3* Author Jonathan R.K. Stroud is a second-year patent attorney at Finnegan, Henderson,
Farabow, Garrett & Dunner LLP, focusing his practice on trial and appellate patent litigation and
concurrent PTAB proceedings. He studied law at American University Washington College of Law,
focusing on Intellectual Property, received his Masters of Arts in Print Journalism from the University
of Southern California Annenberg School of Journalism, and studied biomedical engineering at Tulane
University. He would like to thank Barbara McCurdy, James Barney, P. Andrew Riley, and Erika
Arner, among many others, for their support, interest, and mentorship, and all of the partners of
Finnegan for fostering a collegial, professional atmosphere where legal work can thrive.
4 The Wire: The Detail (HBO television broadcast June 9, 2002).
5 Leahy—Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 18(d)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 331
(2011) (codified as amended in 35 U.S.C.); (hereinafter “America Invents Act”).
6 See The Surprising Rise of the PTAB, MANAGING IP 1, 22 (Sept. 1, 2014) (finding “there has
been a fundamental change in the US patent landscape since September 16, 2012,” “[p]atent owners
have been shocked at how popular IPR proceedings at the PTAB have proven,” and “[n]o one saw this
coming.”)
7 See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. S1053 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer) (finding
with the AIA post-grant trials, “bad patents can be knocked out in an efficient administrative
proceeding, avoiding costly litigation.”).
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holding over 70% of all claims that even reach a decision on the merits unpatentable, 8
with many claims abandoned by the wayside. 9 While a petition must first be
“instituted,” 10 over 75% of all challenged patents result in a trial. 11 Practitioners,
scholars, and commenters have cited the substantive and procedural advantages
afforded the petitioner in these proceedings. 12 And in In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., the
Federal Circuit recently ruled out most avenues of appeal from decisions instituting
IPR. 13
Patent owners—All hope is not lost. Not every petition merits institution; not
every claim is held unpatentable. To be fair, many claims challenged are not
instituted, some reviews settle, and many claims do survive. And note—securing a
denial of institution is likewise not appealable. 14 So how does a patentee avoid these
“death squads” “killing property rights” (as former Chief Judge Randall Rader so
colorfully put it)? 15 Practitioners, Petitioners, and Patent Owners seek answers to
simple questions—What factors result in a petition’s denial? A grant?
In answer, we look to the past patent owners that have avoided institution.
Petitioners should also take note, as the Board has denied a significant sliver of filings.
Given the time, money, fees, expense, and lost opportunity that results from a
petition’s denial—particularly because it may not be appealed—prudence counsels
learning from the mistakes that came before.
This Article answers that need—by reviewing, cataloging, and analyzing the 274
IPR orders handed down through February 2015—prior to the Federal Circuit’s
decision In re Cuozzo—denying petitions to institute, and select motions for rehearing,
and 58 CBM orders denying petitions to institute. 16 This is similar to the treatment
scholars who came before have given inter partes reexaminations, appeals, and the
like. 17 This paper addresses the novel topic of which factors, when present in a petition
for CBM review or IPR, increase the likelihood that the petition will be denied. We
seek to further the goals of the America Invents Act—lowering patent litigation costs
and increasing the chances that undeserving patents are held unpatentable. 18
8 See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK O FFICE , INTER PARTES REVIEW PETITIONS
TERMINATED TO DATE (2014) (providing internal statistics culled from final decisions available on the
USPTO’s public website). According to statistics released by the USPTO, the number differs.
9 Parties may abandon their claims prior to a final written decision pursuant to a Request for
Adverse Judgment or by disclaiming certain claims, for instance, in the Preliminary Patent Owner
Response. See Judgment, 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) (2014); Statutory disclaimers, including terminal
disclaimers, 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a) (2014).
10 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012).
11 UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK O FFICE , AIA TRIAL STATISTICS , (2014).
12 See Mark Consilvio and Jonathan R.K. Stroud, Unraveling the USPTO’s Tangled Web: An
Empirical Analysis of the Complex World of Post-Issuance Patent Proceedings, 20 J. INTELL PROP. L.
(2013); P. Andrew Riley, Jeffrey C. Totten, and Jonathan R.K. Stroud, The Surprising Breadth of
Covered Business Methods Post-Grant Review, 15 COL. SCI . & TECH. L. REV . 235 (2014).
13 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, No. 14-1301 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 2, 2015) (slip. op.).
14 See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, No. 14-1301 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 2, 2015) (slip. op.) (holding
institution decisions non-appealable).
15 Tony Dutra, Rader Regrets CLS Bank Impasse, Comments on Latest Patent Reform Bill,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.bna.com/rader-regrets-cls-n17179879684/.
16 See infra Part I; Part II.
17 See, e.g., Eric J. Rogers, Ten Years of Inter Partes Reexamination Appeals: An Empirical View,
29 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 305 (2012).
18 See infra note 19.
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The Article reviews the orders denying review of patent validity under two AIA
post-grant review procedures, IPR and CBM review, and tracks the spirit of the AIA,
aspiring to “improve patent quality and limit unnecessary and counterproductive
litigation costs.” 19
This Article has four Parts. Part I provides useful background on the USPTO, the
Patent Trials and Appeals Board (“PTAB”), and the America Invents Act (“AIA”). Part
II analyzes the first 100 denials for CBM and IPR proceedings. Part III suggests the
Board has successfully implemented many of the goals of the AIA, and recommends
ways to improve the chances that the Board will institute CBM or IPR review—and
highlights pitfalls parties should avoid. Part IV briefly concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Historical USPTO
Congress created the USPTO (in various iterations throughout America’s history)
to fulfill Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution’s mandate: to
“promote the progress of science and the useful arts by securing for limited times to
inventors the exclusive right to their respective discoveries.” 20 Congress charged the
USPTO with reviewing patent applications, judging them, and issuing meritous
patents.
After an inventor applies to the PTO, the patent examination process in theory
has examiners search through all the readily available prior art, applying any
references against the application via all legal patentability requirements. 21 The
process limits office examination time (often just eighteen hours—and, often, less). It
may not always accurately assess patentability, 22 particularly where the law
fluctuates. (It is widely believed that if examiners had limitless knowledge and had
less stringent deadlines, at least some issued patents would be rejected.) 23
B. The Historical Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)
For most of American history, the patent agency (whether USPTO or otherwise)
had no authority to cancel an issued patent. 24 It took almost two hundred years for

See Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, On H.R. 1249,
The Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (Sept. 6, 2011).
20 THE USPTO: WHO WE ARE , www.uspto.gov/about/index.jsp (last visited March 2, 2014),
21 See generally 35 U.S.C. (2013) (codifying the patent law of the United States).
22 See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV . 1495, 1502
(2001).
23 Id. at 1508–1509.
24 McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. C. Aultman & Co., 169 U.S. 606, 608 (1898) (“It has been
settled by repeated decisions of this court that when a patent has received the signature of the
secretary of the interior, countersigned by the commissioner of patents, and has had affixed to it the
seal of the patent office, it has passed beyond the control and jurisdiction of that office . . . .”).
19
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Congress to eventually give the PTO the power to reexamine. 25 The ex parte
reexamination was designed in part to permit patentees to lend support to the patent’ s
validity in case prior art surfaced after examination. 26 As some have urged, “[m]ore
narrowly tailored patents will enjoy heightened respect from competitors because such
patents are much harder to invalidate.” 27 Besides prior art discovery, post-issuance
modifications to relevant legal precedent may also affect patentability and give cause
to reaffirm patent rights, such as in the arena of 35 U.S.C. § 101 patentable subject
matter. 28
Prior to the passage and implementing of the America Invents Act (“AIA”) in 2011,
the USPTO offered limited methods for third parties to challenge patents the third
parties felt to be invalid. Although some changes had been made between 1836 and
2010, such as limited ex parte reexamination proceedings, the pre-AIA patent regime
had been “one of non-transparency, subjectivity, unpredictability, and excessive
complexity.”
Congressional members have long recognized imperfections in the preexisting
examination system and the need to occasionally reexamine some issued patents that
are important to their owners. The reexamination regime originally had two main
objectives: to bolster the validity of patents and to provide an alternative to litigation.
C. The AIA
The AIA allows the public to challenge patents after the patents are issued. 29
These challenges can be on any validity issue that could be raised as a defense to patent
infringement in court, but is done at the USPTO. 30 Congress created IPR, CBM, and
PGR trials with three major goals in mind: speed, certainty, and efficiency. 31
As of January 1, 2015, the proceedings have proved powerful, with over 70% of all
25 See Wayne B. Paugh, The Betrayal of Patent Reexamination: An Alternative to Litigation, Not
a Supplement, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 177, 181–189 (2010).
26 See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 45 (2011).
27 Greg H. Gardella & Emily A. Berger, United States Reexamination Procedures: Recent Trends,
Strategies and Impact on Patent Practice, 8 J. MARSHALL REV . INTELL. PROP. L. 381, 382 (2009).
28 See, e.g., CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. (CLS Bank V), 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc),
cert. granted sub nom. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l (CLS Bank VI), 134 S. Ct. 1537 (2013).
Patent applicants may generally appeal adverse decisions of examiners to the PTO’s Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences (BPAI, now the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)), from there to the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) directly or to the Eastern District of Virginia and
then to the CAFC, and from the CFC to the United States Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari.
35 U.S.C. § 141 (2012) (for new post-grant review proceedings and ex parte appeals from examination
decisions, appeal may be taken directly to the Federal Circuit). See 35 U.S.C. § 145 (2012) (appeal to
the Eastern District of Virginia); 35 U.S.C. § 306 (2012) (appeal from ex parte reexamination); Rule
10, Rules of the U.S. Supreme Court (rule for certiorari petitions). Similarly, parties who receive
adverse litigation decisions from a federal court may appeal to the CAFC and from there to the
Supreme Court. See 35 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012). Reversals at any level may affect the certainty of
patentability determinations of any decision-maker below.
29 See America Invents Act §§ 6, 18.
30 Id.
31 Alicia Russo, PATENT LITIGATION UNDER THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT at *1 (2014), available at
2014 WL 788284.
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claims and cases resulting in all instituted claims held unpatentable. Many other
challenged claims had been settled, conceded, abandoned, or upheld on appeal.
Figure 1. Overall and Relevant Timeline for Post-Grant Review. 32

32 Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48756 (Aug. 14, 2012). The red square delineates the relevant
timeline for this paper-from filing the petition to receiving a decision instituting or denying review.
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Figure 2: Claim and Case Disposition, IPR and CBM Combined Results by Claim. 33

As shown, the statute divides PTAB trials into two distinct phases: the preinstitution phase, and the post-institution trial. 34 Parties may optionally file a patent
owner’s preliminary response (POPR), although almost 20% of parties have waived
them in the first 28 months. 35 In them, patent owners generally argue against
institution, seeking denial on, among other things, procedural grounds or failure of
proof. 36
Importantly, the decision to institute is not appealable by statute. Congress
wrote, in a section titled “No Appeal” that “[t]he determination by the Director whether
to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable. ”
35 U.S.C. § 314(d). That left open the question of whether interlocutory mandamus
relief or appeals from final decision could reconsider decisions on institution, including
denials.

33 See Daniel F. Klodowski and Jonathan R.K. Stroud, Claim and Case Disposition, AIABLOG.COM
(retrieved Feb. 6, 2015), available at http://www.aiablog.com/claim-an d-case-disposition/.
34 St. Jude Med., Cardiology Div., Inc. v. Volcano Corp., 749 F.3d 1373, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
35 http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/012915_aia_stat_graph.pdf.
36 See The Honorable Sheridan Nedden and Jacqueline Bonilla, Message from Administrative
Patent Judges Sheridan Snedden and Jacqueline Bonilla: Deep Dive Into a Patent Owner Preliminary
Response in an Inter Partes Review Proceeding Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, USPTO’S
AIA BLOG (Feb. 24, 2014), available at http://www.uspto.gov/blog/aia/entry/deep_dive_into_a_patent.
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In St. Jude Med., Cardiology Div., Inc. v. Volcano Corp., 37 the Federal Circuit in
an order held that interlocutory mandamus was unavailable to those denied
institution. They found the denial of institution of IPR to St. Jude was not appealable,
and granted a motion to dismiss filed jointly by Volcano and the intervening USPTO. 38
In symmetry, the Federal Circuit decided In re Procter & Gamble Co., 39 holding that
mandamus was not available to provide immediate review of a decision granting
institution.
Then, in In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, a divided Federal Circuit panel
interpreted § 314(d) to “prohibit review of the decision to institute IPR even after a
final decision.” 40 It found that those decisions were “’final,’ i.e., not subject to further
review,” and could not “reasonably be interpreted as postponing review until after
issuance of a final decision on patentability.” 41 The majority left open the question of
whether mandamus would be available in the extreme case of a decision to institute
giving a “clear and indisputable right” to challenge the ruling. 42
That decision featured a strongly worded dissent by Judge Pauline Newman, who
wrote that “this court holds that PTAB adjudication need not conform to the law and
consider the same evidence as in the courts,” 43 but rather “authorizes the PTAB to
employ the expedients and shortcuts that were developed for the give-and-take of
examination and reexamination, instead of determining validity as a matter of fact
and law, as required in the courts.” 44 She notes:
. . . rulings in connection with the institution of Inter Partes Review, whether
review is granted or denied, cannot be appealed to any court, either by
interlocutory appeal or on appeal of final judgment. 45
She concluded that the AIA “requires thoughtful adjustment to the legislative
purpose, not heavy-handed foreclosure of all review of anything related to the
petition.” 46 Nonetheless, those rulings represent precedent that limits judicial review
of institution decisions, making the PTAB the final arbiter of many of the rules guiding
whether to institute.
These rulings make clear, now more than ever, of the importance and finality of
decisions denying institution. They are effectively the last word on whether petitioners
can hope for institution or denial.

St. Jude Med., 749 F.3d at 1373, 1375–76.
Id. at 1375 (“We hold that we may not hear St. Jude’s appeal from the Director’s denial of the
petition for inter partes review.”).
39St. Jude Med., 749 F.3d at 1376, 1378–79.
40 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, No. 14-1301 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 2, 2015) (slip. op.).
41 Id. at 6.
42 Id. at 8–9.
43 Id. at 4 (Newman, J., dissenting).
44 Id.
45 Id. at 11.
46 Id. at 13.
37
38
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III. INTER-PARTES REVIEW (“IPR”)
One of the changes under the AIA was “the replacement of inter partes
reexamination with inter partes review along with the institution of new post-grant
Several key distinctions between the two are that IPR
review proceedings.” 47
proceedings are more adjudicative, the standard of review is higher, and that parties
seeking IPR during civil litigation are provided a one-year time-limit and are barred
from seeking IPR if a declaratory judgment has already been filed. 48
Sections 42.100-42.123 of the CFR provide for IPR. Claims in an unexpired patent
are given the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent
in which it appears. 49 IPRs may take up to one year; however, the time can be
extended by six months for good cause. 50 The petition must contain:
[T]he petition must set forth:
(a) Grounds for standing. The petitioner must certify that the patent for
which review is sought is available for inter partes review ***
(b) Identification of challenge. Provide a statement of the precise relief
requested for each claim challenged. The statement must identify the
following:
(1) The claim;
(2) The specific statutory grounds under 35 U.S.C. 102 or 103 on which the
challenge to the claim is based and the patents or printed publications relied
upon for each ground;
***
(5) The exhibit number of the supporting evidence relied upon to support the
challenge and the relevance of the evidence to the challenge raised,
including identifying specific portions of the evidence that support the
challenge. The Board may exclude or give no weight to the evidence
where a party has failed to state its relevance or to identify specific
portions of the evidence that support the challenge. 51
From the language above, it should be clear there are three ways in which a
petition for IPR could be denied. First, under 42.104(a) a petition can be denied due to
lack of standing a failure to timely file the petition. Second, under 42.104(b)(1)-(2) the
petition can be denied due to a failure to specifically state the grounds on which the

See America Invents Act § 6; supra note 31.
Supra note 31.
49 Procedure; Pendency, 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2014).
50 Id. at (c).
51 Content of Petition, 37 C.F.R. § 42.104 (2014) (emphasis added).
47
48
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claims are being challenged. Third, due to a lack of evidence or evidence excluded
because the Petitioner failed to state the relevance of the evidence.
Figure 3. Factors Cited by the Board as the Basis for the Denial of Petitions to
Institute IPRs. 52

Analysis of 274 IPR Denials by Factor
Denials

200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0

Failure to identify
sufficiently credible
evidence
Insufficient Reasoning
/conclusory allegations
Did not timely file/failure
to join claims
DJ

Factor
All three paths to denial are analyzed below. This paper looks at 274 IPR denial
opinions. The opinions were reviewed for a) which of the three rationales above
resulted in the denial of the petition and b) reasons why the rationale resulted in the
denial of the petition. The figure above represents the factors over the opinions.
Note, however, that frequently opinions were denied based on both insufficient
evidence and insufficient reasoning. These findings, and the discussion below, supports
the finding that the primary reason petitions for IPR are denied is insufficient
explanation and reasoning.
A. Insufficient Evidence
While,
also denied
insufficient
evidentiary

more often than not 53 denials resulting from insufficient evidence were
due to insufficient reasoning, some petitions were denied purely due to
evidence. In Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, the PTAB denied the petition purely on
grounds. 54 In Dell, the patent-in-suit related to a computer network

See note 11.
See supra Part II.
54 Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, IPR2013-00443, 2014 WL 2528609 1, 12 (P.T.A.B.2014).
52
53

[14:112 2015] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

122

appliance including CPU modules, a power module, and an Ethernet switch module
having hot-swappable connectors corresponding to mating hot swap connectors on a
backplane board. 55 The Petitioner challenged the patent-in-suit on both §102 and §103
grounds. 56
On a dispositive issue, the date of provisional filing applications, Petitioner relied
on Fung for prior art. But the Board noted that “Petitioner [did] not provide any
support from those documents.” 57 Further, the Board continued that “to establish
Fung . . . as a ‘prior art patent or printed publication,’ it must specify the disclosure in
those references that support the relied upon subject matter from Fung . . . . The
Petition fails to specify such disclosure.” “[N]either the Petitioner nor its expert, Dr.
Horst, cite[d] either to Fung Provisional 1 or Fung Provisional 2.” 58 The “Petitioner
fail[ed] to identify the ‘specific portions of the evidence that support’ its challenged, as
required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5).” 59 The Board denied to institute the IPR. 60
In Gracenote Inc. v. Iceberg Industries, the Board refused to institute the IPR
based both on insufficient evidence and insufficient reasoning. In Gracenote, the
patent-in-suit related to apparatus for recognizing free-field audio signals. In
analyzing claim 113, the Board noted that the “Petitioner, however, fails to provide the
required construction of several of the means-plus-function terms of independent claim
113.” 61 The Board continued, “For at least that reason, we determine that Petitioner
fails to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenge to
independent claim 113 or to claims 120–122, which depend therefrom, as anticipated
by Ikezoye.” However, after analyzing the submissions regarding Ikezoye the Board
finds “In view of the foregoing discussion of the deficiencies in disclosure, Petitioner
has not presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that Ikezoye discloses this
limitation of claim 113.” Elsewhere, the Board reject’s Petitioner’s argument regarding
a disclosure by another prior art because the Petitioner does not indicate where the
prior art makes the disclosure the Petitioner asserts. 62 The petition is denied because
the Petitioner failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its
challenge to the patentability of claims due to insufficient evidence and reasoning. 63
Figure 4 below summarizes some of the main reasons the Board articulated for
finding the evidence insufficient.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 2–3.
57 Id. at 10.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 11.
60 See Id. at 12.
61 Gracenote Inc. v. Iceberg Industries, LLC, IPR2013-00551, 2014 WL 2527812 1,38 (P.T.A.B.
2014)
62 Id. at 42.
63 See Id. at 45.
55
56
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Figure 4. Articulated Reasons by the Board Why Evidence in Petitions was not
Sufficient.

B. Insufficient Reasoning
The primary reason petitions to institute IPR are denied is due to insufficient
reasoning. 64 The following cases illustrate what is meant by “insufficient reasoning.”
Petitioners’ insufficient reasoning manifests itself in a failure to explain why the prior
art cited supports the argument asserted by the petitioner.
In Lake Cable v. Windy City Wire Cable and Technology, the Petitioner challenged
claims regarding the ‘795 Patent, a patent titled “Wire and Cable Dispensing
Container and Systems.” 65 Although the Board often does not elaborate on denials
where claims in a petition do not contain sufficient information, here the Board noted
regarding the Petitioner’s argument relating to a rod passing through a spindle that
Petitioner’s argument “appears merely to assume, without factual support or technical
argument, that there would have been no significant difference between hanging
cardboard container 10 by a rod inserted through a passageway located toward the
center of the side panels (so as to “pass through the spindle”). 66 They denied
institution. 67

See supra figure 3.
Lake Cable, LLC v. Windy City Wire Cable and Tech., LLC, IPR2013-00528, 2014 WL 721999
1, 3 (P.T.A.B. 2014).
66 Id. at 29.
67 Id. at 31.
64
65
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In Callcopy, Inc. v. Verient Americas, Inc., the Petitioner challenged claims in the
‘324 patent, a patent disclosing “signal-monitoring apparatus, including telephone
monitoring apparatus which may be arranged for monitoring a plurality of telephone
conversations.” 68 In discussing the challenges, the Board observeed “[t]he claim charts
conflate the three grounds without providing a clear distinction how the identified
disclosures are applied to the individual grounds, and thus none of the grounds are
supported by sufficient reasoning how the identified disclosures relate to the claim
limitations.” 69 The Board thus continued “[w]e are unwilling to engage in supposition
of how to effect analysis.” 70 Moreover, the Board noteed with regard to the Petitioner’s
expert statements that “[s]uch conclusory statements similarly fail to articulate
sufficient reasoning with rational underpinnings to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness.” 71 The Board denied the petition due to insufficient reasoning. 72
The Board’s opinion denying BSP Software LLC et al.’s petition to institute IPR
articulated similar reasoning in BSP Software v. Motio. 73 In BSP Software, the
Petitioner challenged claims relating to the ‘678 patent, a patent relating to methods
of providing automatic version control to a business intelligence system. 74 In
addressing the Petitioner’s arguments with regard to specific claims the Board found,
citing the Patent Owner’s preliminary response, that the “[Petitioner’s] reason to
combine the teachings of [two prior arts] appears to be that both references are
concerned with version control . . . which, without more, is an insufficient rationale to
combine.” 75
The Board continued: “[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained
by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning
with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” 76
Thus, this opinion underlines the centrality of clearly reasoning why prior art supports
the arguments asserted in the petition. The chart below summarizes some of the most
commonly articulated reasons the Board finds petitions to lack specific reasoning.

Callcopy, Inc. v. Verient Americas, Inc., IPR2013-00492, 2014 WL 2528637 (P.T.A.B. 2014).
Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
70 Id. at 7-8.
71 Id. at 9.
72 Id.
73 See BSP Software v. Motio Inc., IPR2013-00307, 2013 WL 8563944 (P.T.A.B. 2013).
74 Id. at 5. The ‘678 patent claimed a “Business intelligence systems are used to gather, store,
analyze and report on business metric data, such as factory production, personnel productivity in a
manufacturing facility, or trends in sales in a retail store environment.” Id. at 3.
75 Id. at 17.
76 Id. (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)) (emphasis added).
68
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Figure 5. Common Explanations by the Board as to Why Reasoning in Petitions
is Insufficient.

Whether the petitioner proposed claim constructions in the petition does not
appear to affect whether a petition will be denied. Some petitioners chose to not
propose claim constructions. This left open the question whether the majority of
denied petitions lacked proper reasoning, or whether a failure to propose claim
constructions gave rise to claim definitions that made it more difficult to adequately
demonstrate the arguments asserted in the petition. To look into this, we analyzed
petitions denied due to insufficient reasoning in which claim constructions were not
proposed by the petitioner, compared with the number of petitions in which claim
construction was proposed. As seen from the graph below, only 7% of the these did not
propose claim construction. This supports the suggestion that petitions for IPR are
primarily denied due to insufficient reasoning. Petitioners may improve their odds by
ensuring they explain their arguments in detail and support them with considerable
evidence.
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Figure 6. Denied Petitions for IPR in Which No Claim Constructions are Proposed
Compared with Denied Petitions for IPR in Which Claim Constructions are Proposed.

C. Untimeliness
The third main factor for IPR denial turns on whether the petitioner files within
the time limit imposed by 35 U.S.C. § 315. Although failure to timely file the petition
constitutes a main factor for denial, its prevalence has decreased as petitions for IPR
have been denied increasingly due to insufficient reasoning. 77
Time-bar denials have two sides, petitioner and patent-owner provoked time bars.
Section 315(a) prevents IPR where a declaratory judgment action was filed and served
against the patent more than a year prior to the filing of the IPR. And 315(b) prevents
an IPR from going forward if the patent owner has been served with a complaint by a
patent owner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner. Numerous important
decisions by the Board have interpreted the provisions. 78
In Samsung v. Fractus, the Board denied the Petitioner’s petition for IPR with
three other petitions relating to three other patents. 79 The Petitioner challenged a
family of patents relating to antenna structures. 80 However, the Board directly denied
See infra figure 7.
Macauto v. BOS GmbH & KG, IPR2012-00004, Paper 18 (PTAB Jan 24, 2013); Motorola
Mobility LLC v. Arnouse, IPR2013-00010, Paper 21 (PTAB Jan. 30, 2013); BAE Sys. v. Cheetah Omni,
LLC, IPR2013-00175, Paper 15 (PTAB July 3, 2013),30, 2013); Universal Remote Control, Inc. v.
Universal Elecs., Inc., IPR2013-00168, Paper 9 (PTAB Aug. 26, 2013); InVue Sec. Prods., Inc. v.
Merchandising Techs., Inc., IPR2013-00122, Paper 17 (PTAB June 27, 2013).
79 Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd.
v. Fractus, IPR2014-00013, 2014 WL 2603989 (P.T.A.B. 2014);
Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Fractus, IPR2014-00012, 2014 WL 2603989 (P.T.A.B. 2014); Samsung
Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Fractus, IPR2014-00011, 2014 WL 2603989 (P.T.A.B. 2014); Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd.
v. Fractus, IPR2014-00008, 2014 WL 2603989 (P.T.A.B. 2014).
80 Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Fractus, IPR2014-00013 at 2.
77
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the petitions stating “[w]e deny the petitions because they were not filed within the
one-year period set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).” 81 In doing so, the Board observes that
“[t]he legislative history of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) indicates that Congress intended inter
partes reviews to provide cost-effective alternatives to litigation.” 82 Notwithstanding
the Petitioner’s arguments to the contrary, the Board found it “consistently has taken
the position that § 315(b) bars institution of an inter partes review based on a complaint
for infringement served more than one year before filing of the request for inter partes
review.” 83 The Board denied the petition for failing to timely file.
On occasion, the § 315(b) time bar interplays with a petitioner’s requirement to
name “all real parties in interest [RPIs].” 84 When a petition fails to do so, it “will not
be accorded a filing date.” 85 And if the “real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner
is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent,” the petition will be
barred under § 315(b).
The RPI inquiry is a highly fact-dependent inquiry that will “assist members of
the Board in identifying potential conflicts, and to assure proper application of the
statutory estoppel provisions[, which,] in turn, seek[] to protect patent owners from
harassment via successive petitions by the same or related parties, to prevent parties
from having a ‘second bite at the apple,’ and to protect the integrity of both the USPTO
and Federal Courts by assuring that all issues are promptly raised and vetted.” 86 The inquiry is
guided by In re Guan, an inter partes reexamination proceeding that delved into the
law of real party-in-interest. 87It has led to cases where the Board denied multiple
related petitions for failure to name a time-barred real party-in-interest. 88
As Samsung v. Fractus and these other cases indicate, the time bar is strictly
enforced, and is one of the main factors in the denial of petitions for IPR. As the figure
below demonstrates, the percentage of petitions denied under § 315 dropped
dramatically between 2013 and 2014. In 2013 the Board denied fifteen petitions for
failure to file within the requirements of § 315, and 25 petitions were denied on the
basis of insufficient evidence and/or insufficient reasoning. In 2014, 30 petitions were
denied under § 315, whereas 115 petitions and 133 petitions were denied for
insufficient evidence and insufficient reasoning, respectively.

Id. at 3.
Id. (citing H.R.REP. NO. 112-98, at 48 (2011)).
83 Id. (citing Universal Remote Control, Inc. vs. Universal Elect., Inc., IPR No. IPR2013- 00168,
slip. op. (P.T.A.B. August 26, 2013); St. Jude Med., Cardiology Div., Inc. vs. Volcano Corp., IPR No.
IPR2013-00258, slip. op. (P.T.A.B. Oct. 16, 2013).
84 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2); 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(1), (b)(1), (b)(2) (petitions must identify “each real
party-in-interest”); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.104 (IPR petitions require “the requirements of” § 42.8).
85 37 C.F.R. § 42.106(a) (a petition “will not be accorded a filing date until the petition satisfies”
certain requirements, including those of § 42.104).
86 Trial Practice Guide (“TPG”), 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,759 (citing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880,
895 (2008)).; see also Zoll Lifecor Corp. v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., IPR2013-00606, Paper 13, at 7–
8 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2014).
87 Inter Partes Reexamination Proceeding, Control No. 95/001,045, Decision Vacating Filing Date
at 8 (Aug. 25, 2008), cited in Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,759 (noting that, with respect to the
real-party-in-interest issue, “the Office’s prior application of similar principles in the inter partes
reexamination context offers additional guidance” for application in inter partes review).
88 See RPX Corp. v. Virnetx, Inc., Cases IPR2014-171 to 177 (P.T.A.B. June 5, 2014); Zoll Lifecor
Corp. v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., IPR2013-00609, Paper 15, at 10 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2014).
81
82

[14:112 2015] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

128

Figure 7: Denial of IPRs by year, showing the early nature of the data.
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D. Other
While rarer, some petitions have been denied under other procedural means, such
as the Board’s broad 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) discretion.
In determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter,
chapter 30, or chapter 31, the Director may take into account whether, and
reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same
prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office. 89
In three cases designated “informative” by the Board, 90 the Board denied institution
because the same art and arguments had been previously presented to the USPTO.
In Prism Pharma Co. v. Choongwae Pharma Corp., 91 a Board panel denied the
petition because “[t]he same prior art . . . and argument substantially the same as

35 U.S.C. § 325(d).
When referencing PTAB proceedings, a three-tier approach has developed: “Precedential
Opinions,” “Informative Opinions,” and “Final Decisions.” See STANDARD O PERATING PROCEDURE 2
(SOP2) (Rev. 8). The vast majority of PTAB decisions are nonbinding “Final Decisions,” useful for
persuasion. Technically, this is considered a “routine” opinion. One panel’s rulings may conflict with
another’s, and it goes to the Board’s and parties’ attempt to harmonize the proceedings. A Board panel
today is not bound by what a Board panel yesterday has done. Second, a case may be “informative ”
and listed on the PTAB website. Third, the PTAB (and before it the BPAI) may designate certain
orders “precedential.” The “precedential" inquiry can be provoked by anyone within 60 days of
issuance of an opinion by requesting in writing that an opinion be made precedential by forwarding
the request, along with accompanying reasons, to the Chief Judge. See SOP2, § II.C. The Board must
then vote; if more than half of the judges agree, the decision is made precedential. To date, only one
decision has been.
91 IPR2014-00315, Paper 14, at 12–13 (P.T.A.B. July 8, 2014) (informative).
89
90
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Petitioner’s current contention . . . were presented previously to the Office.” 92 There,
many of the same arguments in the petition were raised extensively during the
prosecution of the patent. The Petitioner argued that the subject of the challenged
claims did not have written support in the parent application, and so intervening prior
art anticipated them. 93 The same prior art and arguments were presented to the office,
resulting in declaration testimony submitted during prosecution. The Board chose not
to institute IPR.
In Unilever, Inc. d/b/a Unilever v. Procter & Gamble Co., 94 the Board exercised
its “broad discretion” to deny institution under the same provisions, where six
references had been presented in earlier-filed IPRs, seven were new to the proceeding,
and some of the presented § 103 grounds relied on at least one reference previously
presented. Unilever had filed an earlier IPR, IPR2013-00505, which granted review of
some claims, and denied others. The Board found too much overlap in the art and
arguments presented, denying institution.
And in Unified Patents, Inc. v. PersonalWeb Techs., LLC, 95 a Board panel denied
institution to a party over three earlier-filed IPR petitions that introduced the same
reference being asserted. The Board held that denial was just, “[t]aking into
consideration the efficient administration of the Office under 35 U.S.C. § 316(b).”
Some panels have held that petitions may be denied for failure to name the real
parties-in-interest alone. That is because, “[w]here a party files an incomplete petition,
no filing date will be accorded, and the Office will dismiss the petition if the deficiency
in the petition is not corrected within one month.” In Paramount Home Entertainment
Inc. v. Nissim Corp., the Board panel granted additional briefing prior to the
institution decision on the issue of real party-in-interest and found, despite the absence
of any time bar, that the petition should be denied for failure to name the real partyin-interest, the parent corporation.
Lastly, petitions may also be denied for failure to properly certify a translation. 98
That is because, where the original published in another language, the party must
translate that document into English accompanied by “an affidavit attesting to the
accuracy of the translation.” 99 In Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., Ltd. v. Nidec
Motor Corp., 100 the panel found that the “failure to obtain the attesting affidavit at
all—until attention later was drawn to the error by Patent Owner” meant that the
Petitioner could not rely on the reference and so as a result, they denied the petition
on the grounds based on that reference.
96

97

Id.
Id. at 12.
94 IPR2014-00506, Paper 17, at 6 (informative).
95 IPR2014-00702, Paper 13 (P.T.A.B. July 24, 2014).
96 37 C.F.R. § 42.106(b); see Paramount Home Entm’t Inc. v. Nissim Corp., IPR2014-00961, at 8
(Dec. 29, 2014) (denying petition for failing to name real party in interest (“RPI”)).
97 IPR2014-00961, Paper 11 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 29, 2014) (authorizing additional briefing, denying
petitions).
98 In violation of 37 C.F.R. § 42.63(b).
99 37 C.F.R. § 42.63(b); see also TPG, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,761.
100 IPR2014-01121, Paper 20 (P.T.A.B Jan. 21, 2015).
92
93
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E. Summary of Main Factors Contributing to Denial of IPR Petitions
Three main factors contribute to the denial of petitions for IPR. The primary
factor resulting in denial of petitions for IPR is insufficient reasoning. Commonly, this
insufficient reasoning arises from conclusory statements explaining the relevance of
an exhibit to the argument. The second factor is insufficient evidence. This factor,
more often than not, is accompanied by a failure to provide sufficient reasoning. Last,
the third main factor resulting in the denial of petitions to institute IPRs is a failure
to timely file the petition as contemplated in 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).
IV. COVERED BUSINESS METHOD REVIEW (“CBM REVIEW”)
A “Covered Business Method” patent is a patent that “claims a method or
corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in
the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service, except
that the term does not include patents for technological inventions.” 101 Covered
Business Method Patents arose as a congressional reaction to two cases: State Street
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 102 and Bilski v. Kappos. 103
In 1998, the Federal Circuit in State Street held that “the transformation of data
representing discrete dollar amounts by a machine constitutes a practical application
of a mathematical algorithm because it produces a useful, concrete and tangible result
and thus satisfied 35 U.S.C. § 101.” 104 The contested patent was “generally directed to
a data processing system for implementing an investment structure which was
developed for use in Signature's business as an administrator and accounting agent
for mutual funds.” 105 The patented system determined the percentage share that
monitored mutual funds maintains in a centralized “Hub,” while considering daily
changes both in the value of the Hub's investment securities. 106 The central issue
turned on whether the patent claims were statutory. 107 In reversing the district court,
the Federal Circuit found the claims at issue to be statutory because they involved the
application of an algorithm producing useful, concrete results. 108
In 2010, the Supreme Court addressed business method patents. 109 Specifically,
the Court addressed whether a patent can be issued for a claimed invention designed
for the business world where the patent application claims a procedure for instructing
buyers and sellers how to protect against the risk of price fluctuations in a discrete
section of the economy. 110 The Court reviewed three arguments against considering
business method patentable: (1) it is not tied to a machine and transforms no article;
Definitions, 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(a) (2014).
149 F.3d 1368, (Fed. Cir. 1998) abrogated in part by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
103 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
104 AIA § 17:1.
105 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
abrogated in part by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
106 Id. at 1371.
107 Id. at 1370.
108 AIA § 17:1.
109 See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
110 Id. at 3223.
101
102
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(2) it involves a method of conducting business; and (3) it is merely an abstract idea. 111
The patent-in-suit involved a method of determining how buyers and sellers of
commodities in the energy market can protect, or hedge, against the risk of price
changes. 112 The Court ultimately found the patent invalid under the precedents on
the unpatentability of abstract ideas. 113 However, the Court was careful to note
throughout that it did not comment on the patentability of business methods. The
Court observed:
It is important to emphasize that the Court today is not commenting on the
patentability of any particular invention, let alone holding that any of the
above-mentioned technologies from the Information Age should or should not
receive patent protection. This Age puts the possibility of innovation in the
hands of more people and raises new difficulties for the patent law. With ever
more people trying to innovate and thus seeking patent protections for their
inventions, the patent law faces a great challenge in striking the balance
between protecting inventors and not granting monopolies over procedures
that others would discover by independent, creative application of general
principles. Nothing in this opinion should be read to take a position on where
that balance ought to be struck. 114
Congress responded to the Bilski decision after noting that patents already issued
by the USPTO would not survive the heightened Bilski standard and this would
burden the financial and banking industry. 115 In proposing a transitional program for
Covered Business Method patents the House Report remarks:
A number of patent observers believe the issuance of poor business-method
patents during the late 1990's through the early 2000's led to the patent
“troll” lawsuits that compelled the Committee to launch the patent reform
project 6 years ago . . . . The Act responds to the problem by creating a
transitional program 1 year after enactment of the bill to implement a
provisional post-grant proceeding for review of the validity of any business
method patent. In contrast to the era of the late 1990's-early 2000's,
examiners will review the best prior art available. A petition to initiate a
review will not be granted unless the petitioner is first sued for infringement
or is accused of infringement . . . . The program sunsets after 10 years, which
ensures that patent holders cannot delay filing a lawsuit over a shorter time
period to avoid reevaluation under the transitional program. 116
Section 18 of the America Invents Act provides:

See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
Id.
113 Id. at 3231.
114 Id. at 3228.
115 America Invents Act § 17:1.
116 H.R. REP. 112-98, 54, reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 84-85; see also AIA § 17:1.
111
112
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(a) TRANSITIONAL PROGRAM.—
(1) ESTABLISHMENT.— . . . The transitional proceeding implemented
pursuant to this subsection shall be regarded as, and shall employ the
standards and procedures of, a post-grant review under chapter 32 of title 35,
United States Code, subject to the following:
...
(B) A person may not file a petition for a transitional proceeding with respect
to a covered business method patent unless the person or the person's real
party in interest or privy has been sued for infringement of the patent or has
been charged with infringement under that patent.
...
(E) The Director may institute a transitional proceeding only for a patent
that is a covered business method patent.
...
(d) DEFINITION.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of this section, the term “covered business
method patent” means a patent that claims a method or corresponding
apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in the
practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service,
except that the term does not include patents for technological inventions.
(2) REGULATIONS.—To assist in implementing the transitional proceeding
authorized by this subsection, the Director shall issue regulations for
determining whether a patent is for a technological invention. . . . 117
A. Statutory Denials of CBMs under Section 18 of the AIA
The CBM reviews are broader than IPR in that they can challenge patents under
§ 101 for subject matter eligibility or § 112 for written description, enablement, or other
failures, as well as under § 102 or § 103 for anticipation or obviousness. But as noted,
it requires the patent to be a “covered business method” patent. In analyzing the early
institution decisions, we determined the rate of grant for each type of ground (as of
December 16, 2014), as follows:

117

AIA § 18.
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Total 101 Challenges
101 Challenges Instituted
Institution Rate of 101 Challenges

80
71
88.75%

Total 112 Challenges
112 Challenges Instituted
Institution Rate of 112 Challenges

53
17
32.08%

Total 102 Challenges
102 Challenges Instituted
Institution Rate of 102 Challenges

69
36
52.17%

Total 103 Challenges
103 Challenges Instituted
Institution Rate of 103 Challenges

103
66
64.08%

As you can see, parties have had substantive success instituting § 101 challenges early,
while parties have struggled to convince the PTAB to institute on § 112 challenges.
While the numbers are hardly statistically significant, they do represent an interesting
facet of the debate, and suggest that perhaps the PTAB recognizes the statutory
history outlined above suggesting that CBMs were intended to deal with patents
thrown into doubt by Bilski, whose legacy continued in the subsequent CLS Bank and
other cases. 118
Under Section 18 of the AIA the PTAB can deny petitions for CBM for three
statutory reasons:
(1) lack of standing under § 18(a)(1)(B) because the party has not been sued
for infringement;
(2) None of the claims challenged under § 18(a)(1) generally or § 18(a)(1)(C)
specifically is more likely than not unpatentable; or

118 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Bancorp
Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Complaint at
29, CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. (CLS Bank I), 667 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 07
Civ. 974); CLS Bank I, 667 F. Supp. 2d at 29 (denying parties’ Rule 56 summary judgment motions);
CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. (CLS Bank II), 411 F. App’x 306, 307 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (denying
CLS Bank’s petition for leave to appeal); CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. (CLS Bank III), 768
F. Supp. 2d 221, 225 (D.D.C. 2011) (granting CLS Bank’s motion for summary judgment on § 101
issues in light of Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)); CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. (CLS
Bank IV), 685 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (reversing and remanding CLS Bank III); CLS Bank Int’l v.
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. (CLS Bank V), 484 Fed. App’x. 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (vacating CLS Bank IV and
granting rehearing en banc); CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. (CLS Bank VI), 717 F.3d 1269
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc); CLS Bank VII, 134 S. Ct. 734 (2013) (Mem.) (granting certiorari), argued,
No. 13-298 (Mar. 31, 2014).
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(3) the challenged patent does not fit the definition of a “covered business
method patent” under § 18(d)(1).
B. Factors Contributing to the Denial of Petitions to Institute CBM Review
From 2013 to January 29, 20155, parties filed 291 petitions requesting CBM
review. They decided 171 CBMs, denying 43 and granting 128. 119 All were denied due
to the patentability of all claims challenged under § 18(a)(1) or § 18(a)(1)(C), rather
than any procedural errors. 120 Nearly all petitions have had “standing” (i.e., met all
statutory requirements) and nearly all petitions have challenged “covered business
method patents,” with a few key exceptions highlighted below.
This begs two questions: First, what are the factors relating to challenges to
claims under § 18(a)(1) or § 18(a)(1)(C) that fall short of convincing the PTAB that the
challenged patent more likely than not contains at least one unpatentable claim?
Second, what factors contribute to the PTAB’s decision that the challenged patents
should not be denied either due to not meeting the definition of a “covered business
method patent” under § 18(d)(1), or due to lack of standing under § 18(a)(1)(B)?
Petitions for CBM review can be denied due to issues of standing or based on the
claims. The issues of standing are (1) whether it claims a method or corresponding
apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice,
administration, or management of a financial product or service, except that the term
does not include patents for technological inventions,” 121 (2) whether it is a
technological invention, 122 and (3) the petitioner or petitioner's real party in interest
or privy must have been sued for infringement of the patent or has been charged with
infringement under that patent. 123
C. Financial Product Prong
In determining whether a patent is a financial product or service for a covered
business method patent review, the focus is on the claims. 124 The “legislative history
explains that the definition of covered business method patent was drafted to
119
See USPTO, AIA Progress, Slide 3 (as of Jan. 29, 2015) available at
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/012915_aia_stat_graph.pdf
120 For the first six denials, see Gilman v. Stoneeagle Services, Inc., CBM2013-47 (P.T.A.B. 2014);
Apple Inc. v. Sightsound Technologies, LLC, CBM2013-00019 (P.T.A.B. 2013); Apple Inc. v.
Sightsound Technologies, LLC, CBM2013-00021 (P.T.A.B. 2013); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive
Cas. Ins., CBM2013-00003 (JL) (P.T.A.B. 2013); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins.,
CBM2013-00001 (JL) (P.T.A.B. 2013); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins., CBM2012-00011
(JL) (P.T.A.B. 2013).
121 AIA § 18(d)(1); see “Definitions”, 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(a) (2014).
122 AIA §§ 18(a)(1)(B), 18(d)(1); see also “Who may petition for a covered business method patent
review”, 37 C.F.R. § 42.302 (2014).
123 America Invents Act § 18(a)(1)(B).
124 See Apple Inc. v. Sightsound Techs. LLC, CBM2013-00021, Paper 17 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 8, 2013);
See generally Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents—Definitions of Covered
Business Method Patent and Technological Invention; Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 48734, 48735–48736
(Aug. 14, 2012) (hereinafter “CBM Rules”).
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encompass patents, claiming activities that are financial in nature, incidental to a
financial activity or complementary to a financial activity.” 125 The PTAB generally
interprets “financial product or service” broadly. 126
Recently in Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Jazz Pharmaceuticals, Inc., four related
IPRs were denied under the financial product prong because, according to the panel,
they did “not recite a product or service particular to or characteristic of financial
institutions such as banks, insurance companies, and investment houses. 127 The panel
in Par rejected CBM petitions because the Petitioner did “not analyze the claim
language, in detail and in context, to explain how the claim language recites method
steps involving the movement of money or extension of credit in exchange for
a product or service . . . .” 128 This was the first time a petition was denied for a
patent classified in USP Class 705, the “sweet spot” of CBM patents. 129
Other denials have discussed the “financial product” prong. 130 In Apple Inc. v.
Sightsound Technologies, the Board found the patent at issue to be a covered business
method patent even though the patent did not relate to a financial business. 131 The
board found the patent to recite a method to perform “data processing or other
operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product
or service, as required by Section 18(d)(1) of the AIA” because the patent involved an
electronic sale and charging of an account. 132 In Sightsound, the Petitioner challenged
claims 1, 64, and 95 of the ‘440 patent on the grounds that the claims do not recite
patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and that the claims are
unpatentable for obviousness-type double patenting. 133 Claim 1 of the patent ‘440
patent recited:
selling electronically by the first party to the second party through
telecommunications lines, the desired digital video or digital audio signals in
the first memory, the second party is at a second party location and the step
of selling electronically includes the step of charging a fee via
telecommunications lines by the first party to the second party at a first party
location remote from the second party location, the second party has an
account and the step of charging a fee includes the step of charging the
account of the second party (emphasis in original). 134
The Board found that “the electronic sale of something, including charging a fee
to a party’s account, is a financial activity, and allowing such a sale amounts to
providing a financial service.” 135 The Board also looked to the specification of the ’440
125 Apple Inc. v. Sightsound Techs. LLC, CBM2013-00021, Paper 17, at 1, 10-11 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 8,
2013) (citing 157 Cong. Rec. S5432 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer)).
126 Apple Inc. v. Sightsound Techs. LLC, CBM2013-00021, Paper 17, (P.T.A.B. Oct. 8, 2013).
127 CBMs2014-00149, -00150, -00151, and -00153, Papers 12 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 13, 2015).
128 Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
129 See MeridianLink, Inc. v. DH Holdings, LLC, CBM2012-00008, Paper 1 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 13,
2012).
130 Id.
131 Id. at 11–12.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 7.
134 Id. at 11.
135 Id. at 1, 10.
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patent. 136 The specification stated that the patent is a method for electronic “sale” of
digital media involving a “purchase.” These facts, in addition to the details of how the
transaction is facilitated, persuaded the board that the ‘440 patent satisfied the AIA’s
requirement that CBMs involve a financial product or service. 137
Sightsound argued that this did not qualify as a CBM because, it argued, “only
patents with a clear nexus to the financial business are eligible for a covered business
method review.” 138 As such, Sightsound argued that “a petitioner must show more
than just the existence of a payment step or a monetary element in a patent claim to
establish the necessary nexus between the patent and a financial product or
service.” 139
The Board, however, rejected these arguments. 140 Citing the statutory language
and the legislative history of the AIA, the Board found in favor of a broad
interpretation. 141 First, the Board noted that the AIA requires no nexus to a financial
business, but a “method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or
other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial
product or service.” Further, the Board highlighted comments from Senator Schumer
noting “[n]othing in the [AIA] limits use of section 18 to banks, insurance companies
or other members of the financial services industry. . . . it applies to patents that can
apply to financial products or services.” 142 The Board also noted Senator Schumer’s
comment that “[a]t its most basic, a financial product is an agreement between two
parties stipulating movements of money or other consideration now or in the future.” 143
The Board found that although claim 1 of the ‘440 patent did not relate to a financial
services business, it did recite the electronic movement of money between entities,
which is an activity that is financial in nature. 144
The Board’s comfort with using this loose interpretation of “financial product or
service” could be explained by the lack of binding precedent. In Sightsound, the Patent
Owner’s argued that “a determination that the ‘440 patent is a covered business
method patent would be a ‘radical expansion of the scope of patents subject to CBM
review’ because ‘the patent itself has nothing to do with finance.’” 145 However, the
Board noted that “the Board reviews petitions on their own facts to determine whether
the challenged patent is a covered business method patent under the AIA definition, ”
and finding some facts in the Sightsound case relating to finance. 146

Id.
Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
136
137

at 11–12.
at 12.
at 12-13.
at 13 (emphasis in original).
at 13.
at 14.
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D. Technological Innovation Prong
Patents for technological innovations are not included in most cass the Board
found technological prong to be satisfied. Section 42.301(b) of the CFR holds that:
In addition to the definitions in §42.2, the following definitions apply to
proceedings under this subpart D:
In determining whether a patent is for a technological invention solely for
purposes of the Transitional Program for Covered Business Methods (section
42.301(a)), the following will be considered on a case-by-case basis: whether
the claimed subject matter as a whole recites a technological feature that is
novel and unobvious over the prior art; and solves a technical problem using
a technical solution. 147
In addition, the following claim drafting techniques do not render a patent a
“technological innovation”:
(a) Mere recitation of known technologies, such as computer hardware,
communication or computer networks, software, memory, computerreadable storage medium, scanners, display devices or databases, or
specialized machines, such as an ATM or point of sale device.
(b) Reciting the use of known prior art technology to accomplish a process or
method, even if that process or method is novel and non-obvious.
(c) Combining prior art structures to achieve the normal, expected, or
predictable result of that combination. 148
In Experian Marketing Solutions, Inc. v. RPOST Communications Ltd, 149 the
Board held that the petitioner failed to establish the challenged patent did not claim a
technological invention. The claims there, directed to a “System and method for
verifying delivery and integrity of electronic messages,” included claims reciting a Mail
Transport Agent and discussions of recording at a server a portion of selected protocol
dialogue, because they had failed to establish those technologies were known at the
time.
In Gillman v. Stoneegale Services, Inc. the Board denied the petition for CBM
Review; however, the denial was not based on a failure to meet the “technological
innovation” standard. In Gillman, the Board wrote “We are persuaded that claim 1 as
a whole does not recite a technological feature that is novel and unobvious over the
prior art.” 150 The patent in question, ’904 Patent, titled “Medical Benefits Payment

Definitions, 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(b) (2012).
Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,763-64 (Aug. 14, 2012).
149 CBM2014-00010, Paper No. 20 (PTAB Apr. 22, 2014).
150 Gillman v. Stoneegale Servs., Inc, CBM 2013-00047 1, 9 (P.T.A.B. 2014).
147
148
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System,” related to “facilitating payments for medical benefits, and streamlining
payment of health care providers by administrators and insurance carriers.” 151
The patent transferred information including credit and debit card information
Petitioner
with information relating to the insurance benefits purchased. 152
challenged the patentability of claims 1-7, 9, 10, 12, 17, and 22 of the ’904 Patent under
Sections 102 and 103. In finding that the ‘904 patent meets the technological
innovation hurdle 153 the Board noted that the patent “only recites the presence of wellknown physical technologies in support of the claimed method. ‘Medical service
terminals’ were well-known data-entry-computer systems used in a medical office at
the time of invention.” 154 The Board further notes “’Computer generated image files’
also were known in the art at the time of invention, as was the media used for
facilitating the transmission of such files between electronic systems.” 155 Claim 1 uses
structures and methods that are “known technologies, such as computer hardware,
communication or computer networks, software, memory, [or] computer-readab le
storage medi[a],” and therefore the ‘904 patent met the technological innovation test
because only one claim need meet the test. 156
As seen, the technological innovation test, similar to the financial product test, is
easily met. Although the authors of the AIA anticipated the exception to be narrow 157 ,
no petition has ever been denied for not meeting the technological innovation test. 158
E. Denials on Substantive Grounds
More CBM petitions have been denied on substantive grounds, like failure of
proof. In Gillman, all claims failed to persuade the Board that at least one claim was
not patentable against prior art. 159 In Sightsound, the Petitioner challenges claims
because the claims do not recite patent-eligible subject under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and lack
sufficient written description support under 35 U.S.C. § 112. 160 The Board denied

Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3.
153 See Andrew Riley et al., The Surprising Breadth of Post-Grant Review for Covered-BusinessMethod Patents: A New Way to Challenge Patent Claims, 15 COLUM . SCI . & TECH. L. REV . 235, 275
(2014) (describing 1. Whether the patent is covered under CBM review 2. Whether it is a technological
innovation and 3. Whether the patent meets the standard of review as the three hurdles of CBM
Review). “Any party seeking a CBM review must carefully analyze three major substantive hurdles.
First, the petitioner must establish that the challenged patent qualifies as a “covered business
method.” Second, the petitioner must show that the claimed invention is not a “technological
invention” exempt from CBM review. Third, the petitioner must show that the standard of review is
met—namely, that it is more likely than not that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.”
154 Gillman v. Stoneegale Services, Inc., CBM 2013-00047 at 9.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Andrew Riley et al., The Surprising Breadth of Post-Grant Review for Covered-BusinessMethod Patents: A New Way to Challenge Patent Claims, 15 COLUM . SCI . & TECH. L. REV . 235, 279
(2014).
158 See supra Figure 2.
159 Gillman v. Stoneegale Servs., Inc, CBM 2013-00047 1, 17–22 (P.T.A.B. 2014).
160 Apple v. Sightsound Techs., LLC, CBM2013-00019 1, 6 (P.T.A.B. 2013).
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Apple’s petition because it did not demonstrate that the challenged claims were more
likely than not unpatentable based on the asserted grounds. 161
In a separate petition by Apple against Sightsound, Apple challenged claims
because the claims did not recite patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101
and that the claims are unpatentable for obviousness-type double patenting. 162 The
Board denied Apple’s petition because it did not demonstrate that the challenged
claims were more likely than not unpatentable based on the asserted grounds. 163 In
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company, the
Board succinctly summarized its denial in a paragraph at the end of the introduction:
Liberty challenges the patentability of claims 1-78 of the ’598 patent. Taking
into account Progressive’s preliminary response, we determine that the
information presented in the petition does not demonstrate that it is more
likely than not that claims 1-78 are unpatentable. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §
324 and section 18(a) of the AIA, we do not authorize a covered business
method patent review to be instituted as to claims 1-78 of the ’598 patent for
the grounds of unpatentability asserted in Liberty’s petition.
Accordingly, the petition is DENIED. 164
The Board denied a separate petition by Liberty challenging claims of a different
patent as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 because the information
presented in the petition did not demonstrate that the challenged claims were
unpatentable under the preponderance of the evidence standard. 165 The Board
similarly denied a separate petition by Liberty challenging a separate patent under 35
U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 because the petition did not demonstrate that it is more likely
than not that the claims were unpatentable. 166

Id. at 22.
Apple v. Sightsound Techs., LLC, CBM2013-00021 1, 2 (P.T.A.B. 2013).
163 Id. at 26.
164 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., CBM2013-00003, Paper (JL) 1, 2 (P.T.A.B.
2013).
165 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., CBM2013-00001, Paper (JL) 1, 2 (P.T.A.B.
2013).
166 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., CBM2012-00011, Paper (P.T.A.B. 2013).
161
162
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Figure 8. Chart Illustrating the Statutory Bases for CBM Denial. 167
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F. Empirical Results
As these decisions illustrate, the Board has primarily denied petitions for CBM
Review because all asserted claims are not more likely than not unpatentable. The
claims are rarely denied due to issues of standing, such as the “financial product” and
“technical innovation” test. These findings are summarized below in the analysis of 58
CBM opinions.
V. FINDINGS: THE BOARD IS CAREFULLY AND JUDICIOUSLY WEIGHING EACH PETITION,
AND EMBODYING THE STATUTORY GOALS OF THE AIA
“Striving to better, oft we mar what's well.” 168
As shown above, Board panels for two years have carefully weighed relevant
statutory factors, applying the new law with rigor and precision, and denying
incomplete, barred, and insufficient petitions.
Given the monumental task of
implementing an entirely new set of rules, procedures, and substance, the Board has
performed admirably. While change is never easy, and the quest to further improve
efficiency and rigor continues, the PTO should be commended for their application of
the inter partes review statute. To practitioners and scholars, this paper makes three
proposals to practitioners, and three proposals for further research.
167 See also P. Andrew Riley et al., The Surprising Breadth of Post-Grant Review for CoveredBusiness-Method Patents: A New Way to Challenge Patent Claims, 15 COLUM . SCI . & TECH. L. REV .
235, 278 n.241 (2014) (citing the data and chart used in this paper).
168 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE , K ING LEAR, act I, sc. IV.,
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To practitioners: First, in drafting petitions for CBM review, focus on illustrating
the unpatentability of the claims unless a genuine issue of standing exists. That the
Board has rarely denied a petition for not meeting the “financial product” test, the
“technical innovation” test, or other standing issues underlies this proposal. 169 It
should be relatively clear what qualifies for a CBM, and what does not. 170 Second,
practitioners writing petitions may increase the likelihood the petition will be accepted
by reducing the number of conclusory sentences in the petition and focusing on clear
evidentiary support for a few grounds. As one possible solution, this paper proposes a
“three-sentence rule” for references to prior art in petitions: draft one sentence
referencing the prior art, and at least two sentences explaining the prior art’s
relevance. While each case is different following the “three-sentence rule” at a
minimum will ensure petitioners are less likely to rely on “conclusory” assertions
rejected by the Board. Third, in consideration of the denials criticizing the submissions
by experts, this paper proposes that practitioners try to review the logic and
completeness of each expert’s teachings. Although the majority of expert submissions
will likely pass such review, adding this step in submitting a petition for IPR could
increase the likelihood the petition results in an institution.
To future researchers: First, the literature would benefit from an exhaustive
comparison between the denied and instituted petitions. As of January 29, 2015, only
about 20% of IPRs had been denied. We must continue reviewing the prevalence of the
factors discussed in this paper in the stages of post-grant review following institution.
Do the same three factors discussed regarding denial of petitions for IPR play as
influential a role in the Patent Owner response? Second, what role do settlements play
in the likelihood an instituted review will continue to a final written decision? Third,
this paper would benefit from feedback from practitioners whether considering the
factors discussed in this paper when preparing petitions for CBM review or IPR has a
significant effect on the likelihood of institution. These are the three recommendations
for further research.
VI. CONCLUSION
“All the fruit is ripe, plunged in fire, cooked,
And they have passed their test on earth, and one law is this:
… Many things however
Have to stay on the shoulders. Steadiness is essential.
Forewords, however, or backwards we will
Not look. Let us learn to live swaying
As in a rocking boat on the sea.” 171
As of the two-year anniversary of IPR and CBM proceedings, parties have filed
over 2,000, surpassing even ambitious expectations for the program—and representing
See supra Figure 2.
But see P. Andrew Riley, et al., The Surprising Breadth of Covered Business Method Post-Grant
Review, 15 COLUM . SCI . & TECH. L. REV . 235, 278 (2014).
171 FREIDRICH HOLDERLIN, All the Fruit in The Rag and Bone Shop of the Heart, 242 (Robert Bly
trans. 1992).
169
170
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a sea change in patent law. Many have merited institution; many have not. While
cases were instituted in over 75% of all proceedings, 172 that percentage might fall, as
certain patents survive review, others are held unpatentable, and the Board faces more
patents and patent families already challenged under IPR or CBM. 173 As some
practitioners conjecture, perhaps the “low-hanging fruit” of particularly problematic
patents may grow scarce in years to come, further depressing these percentages. 174
And as battle-tested patents emerge from the Board largely immune to further validity
challenges, certain petitions may be denied under § 325(d) as presenting art and
arguments substantially similar to those previously considered by the Office. 175
IPR and CBM proceedings, if used effectively, can lead to efficient outcomes,
where good patents strengthen and poor patents return from issue. This Article seeks
to help, to “improve patent quality and limit unnecessary and counterproductive
litigation costs,” 176 through discussing the main factors contributing to the denial of
petitions for CBM review and IPR.
Reviewing all decisions to deny petitions to institute CBM review demonstrated
that the standing factors—such as the “financial product” test—have not accounted for
the denial of such petitions, but rather that the petitions have been denied on the basis
of the challenged claims. Reviewing the first 100 denials of institution for IPRs
illustrates that three primary factors resulting in denial: insufficient evidence,
insufficient reasoning, and failure to timely file the petition.
This Article demonstrates that the primary factor, with increasing relevance, is
the petitioner’s insufficiently articulated arguments. Fortunately, this highlights the
control experienced petitioners have in increasing the likelihood petitions for IPR will
be instituted. If practitioners consider the foregoing, we look forward to a more
complete, just, and efficient implementation of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.

UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK O FFICE , AIA TRIAL STATISTICS, (Feb. 2, 2015).
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(d) and 325(d) (2012) (granting the director discretion to deny PGR and
IPR in light of art or arguments that were “substantially the same” as those previously considered by
the office).
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175 See, e.g., Prism Pharma Co. v. Choongwae Pharma Corp., IPR2014-00315, Paper 14, at 12– 13
(P.T.A.B. July 8, 2014) (informative) (denying institution under § 325(d) because “The same prior art
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Review: More Cost Effective Patent Dispute Resolution.
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